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The Winter War: Its Causes and Effects
Ethan Beck
History and Government—Cedarville University

Introduction

T

he Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940, also known as the Winter War, forms a curious
portion of World War II history that bears further study. Occurring during the “Phony
War”—the period of calm following Hitler’s invasion of Poland—the Winter War
offers a glimpse into the attitudes of the major powers as the growing necessity of the
coming war becomes increasingly clear during 1939 and 1940. Specifically, the Winter War
provides insight into Soviet imperialism and its concerns over German aggression and
forms a crucial portion of the German decision to invade Russia in the summer of 1941.
Without consideration of the Winter War and the conclusions drawn from it by the major
world powers, it is difficult to form a satisfactory explanation of each power’s behavior in
the Second World War. Therefore, though it was a relatively brief conflict, the Winter War
is crucial to a proper understanding of the events of World War II as a whole.
The first pieces of the puzzle that must be reconstructed and analyzed are found in the
details leading into the origin of the Russo-Finnish War. This origin is composed of three
elements of prime significance: the history of Finland’s relationship with Russia, Russia’s
perception of its vulnerabilities in 1939-1940 to a German invasion, and Russia’s desire to
project strength as a means of deterrence.
The origin of the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940 begins with the Russian Revolution of
1917. The upheaval of the First World War and the resulting revolution ousted the Tsar’s
government, ushering in massive changes in the Russian political system. These changes
offered favorable opportunities for some portions of the former Tsar’s empire, such as
Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Finland to seek independence from the new communist
government.1
Finland, though it had been a part of Russia since it was conquered by Alexander I of Russia
in the Finnish War of 1809,2 had maintained a high level of national autonomy as a semiself-ruling Grand Duchy in the Tsar’s Russia. In addition, Finland’s nationalism had been
awakened to the dangers inherent in being the subjects of Russian power after Tsar
Nicholas II’s attempts at the “Russification” of Finnish politics in 1899.3 After the Bolshevik
John Keegan, The First World War (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 378.
John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin Books, 1989), 47.
3 Jyrkil Loima, “A Case Study of Education and Nationalism: the Multicultural Fight for ‘Souls and Minds’ in
Finland, 1891-1921,” The Historian, Vol. 76, No. 4 (2014): 752.
1
2
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toppling of the Tsar’s regime, Finland was ready to break with Russia and seized this
period of Russian disorganization as an opportunity for complete independence from any
superior power.4
One of Russia’s new leaders, Vladimir Lenin, was confident that the communist revolution
begun in Russia would spread to the world. For this reason, he was willing to allow people
groups like the Finns to secede from Russia, sure that they would return when the
proletariat gained strength and overthrew their capitalist overlords as Russia itself had
done.5 However, the inevitable revolution was not the only reason Russia behaved this way.
In 1917 the fledgling Bolshevik government in Leningrad—formerly St. Petersburg—had
other pressing concerns.6 The Soviets were struggling to assert and maintain control at
home as the makings of a civil war developed.7 Furthermore, the people groups seeking
independence, Finland included, had maintained close associations with Germany.8 As
Germany quickly demonstrated its willingness to materially and militarily support proGerman movements in these regions,9 war-torn Russia was forced to allow the
balkanization of its old holdings for fear of further conflict with Germany.10 As such, the
fragile new regime recognized that it did not have the practical might or political capital to
resist Finnish independence, and contented itself with covertly supporting the quickly
defeated communist party in Finland’s brief civil war.11
After achieving its independence from Russia and—with German aid—quelling its civil war
with the defeat of the pro-communist forces,12 Finland solidified its global position with the
Treaty of Dorpat in 1920. Negotiated between Finland and Russia, the treaty set the
territorial boundary lines and detailed the mutual rights and obligations of each toward the
other.13 While the treaty was an important diplomatic step for the new nations, neither
Russia nor Finland was particularly pleased with the details. The Finnish nationalists felt
that Finland’s delegation had conceded more to their former overlords than it should
have,14 while Russian weakness forced them to grant Finland control of a large strip of the
Karelian Isthmus near the recently-renamed Russian city of Leningrad.15 Future Russian
leaders, most notably Joseph Stalin, would find this demarcation uncomfortably close to
Leningrad’s vital population centers.16

Keegan, The First World War, 378.
Ibid, 378.
6 Loima, “A Case Study of Education and Nationalism,” 762.
7 Keegan, The First World War, 380.
8 Ibid, 378.
9 Ibid, 378.
10 Ibid, 379.
11 Ibid, 378.
12 Ibid, 380.
13 Albin T. Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War: A Study of Russo-Finnish Diplomacy,” World Politics, Vol. 6,
No. 2 (1954): 169.
14 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 169.
15 Keegan, The Second World War, 47.
16 Ibid, 47.
4
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There are several important conclusions to draw about Finnish and Russian attitudes and
perspectives from Finland’s history with Russia that impacted the development of the
Winter War. Given its hundred-year control of Finland, Russia saw Finland as a part of its
historic territory and hegemony, which was necessary to restore its place as an empire.
Finland, given Russia’s conquest of its territory in 1809, the period of Russification by the
Tsars, and Communist Russia’s interference in its civil war, saw the new Russian
government in much the same light as it saw the old, as a potential aggressor to its
sovereignty.17 While these attitudes and perspectives lingered under the surface and
informed the strategic choices made by both sides, the impetus for the conflict stemmed
from the Treaty of Dorpat.
Although both sides were initially unhappy with the borders settled upon in 1920, those
attitudes had changed by 1939. The Finns, though initially displeased, had grown
accustomed to the treaty and were content to retain it.18 Russia, on the other hand, had
originally viewed the treaty as a stain upon its national honor, but was content to wait on a
natural remedy through time and the inevitable process of revolution. However, changing
world circumstances had changed its views and Russian now considered an alteration to
the Treaty of Dorpat’s terms as of vital importance to its security. By the late 1930s,
German actions had shortened Russian patience for the inevitable communist revolution
that was supposed to return its control of Finnish territory. Specifically, the Nazi-Soviet
Nonaggression Pact and the subsequent German invasion of Poland caused considerable
angst in Russia.
The Nazi-Soviet Pact, which split Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia,19 gave
Russia control over the Baltic nations—including Finland.20 The restoration of these
nations would substantially allow Communist Russia to mirror the borders of its old
empire under the Tsars.21 While this agreement formed an incredible opportunity for the
new communist government to assert itself as a rising world power, it also contained a
potential danger should Russia fail to capitalize on it. Germany quickly took advantage of
its portion of territory allotted by the agreement when it aggressively seized western
Poland in 1939. If Russia failed to exert control over the areas given to it in the Pact, there
was a danger that its co-signer would see Russia as weak and ripe for German invasion. The
effect of the agreement, according to one scholar, was that Russia attempted to mimic
Germany by “imposing [its] will on smaller powers.”22 Attempting to follow Germany’s
pattern of behavior, Russia demanded and received mutual assistance and military access

Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 169.
Ibid, 173.
19 Robert M. Citino, “White Death,” World War II, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2014): 44.
20 Kimmo Rentola, “The Finnish Communists and the Winter War,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 33,
No. 4 (1998): 592.
21 Citino, “White Death,” 45.
22 D. W. Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland, 30 November 1939,” Soviet Studies, Vol. 38, No.
2 (1986): 221.
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treaties with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia,23 leaving Finland as the only Baltic holdout to
Russian hegemony.24
The Nazi-Soviet Pact, then, predisposed Russia to be unwilling to accept the status quo of
its interwar period relationship with Finland.25 However, Russia was also concerned that
any perception of weakness would lead to a major problem for its national security.
Specifically, Russia was intensely worried that Germany, its ideological opponent, would
invade Russia through Finland.26 While any potential invasion was a matter of
consternation, the close proximity of the Finnish border to the key Russian city of
Leningrad essentially guaranteed the city’s capture by the German blitzkrieg. 27 Thus,
Russia, due to its feelings of vulnerability and need to project strength to hide weakness,
determined to win concessions from Finland,28 ideally through diplomatic might, but
military force remained an option.
The need to break the status quo with Finland heightened after the Austro-German
Anschluss in March of 1938. From an ideological perspective, Bolshevik Russia viewed war
and expansion as the essence of Nazism.29 Germany’s aggressive expansionism after
Hitler’s rise to power only confirmed Russian concerns. Faced with Nazi Germany’s
growing threat to the future of the Soviet Revolution in Western Europe, the Soviets were
looking for ways to protect themselves and further their interests. Shortly thereafter,
Russia opened negotiations with Finnish diplomats to strengthen its position against the
potential of German aggression.30 In exchange for a generous gift of territory in Soviet
Karelia,31 the Russians demanded the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus be moved 70
km to the west—a mutual assistance pact against German aggression—and access to a
naval base off the western coast of Finland.32 All of these demands were calculated as
defensive measures against a German invasion. The territory on the Karelian Isthmus and
the space opened by moving the border would allow the Russians to create a land buffer to
protect Leningrad, while the naval base would, in theory, allow the Russians to prevent a
German force from landing in Finland in the first place.33

Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland,” 208.
Peter J. Beck, “The Winter War in the International Context: Britain and the League of Nation’s Role in the
Russo-Finnish Dispute, 1939-1940,” Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1981): 59.
25 Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland,” 221.
26 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,”170-172.
27 Ibid, 172.
28 Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland,” 222.
29 Toomas Varrak, “The Secret Dossier of Finnish Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim: On the Diplomatic Prelude of
World War II,” Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2016): 83.
30 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 169.
31 P.W. Doerr, “Frigid but Unprovocative: British Policy towards the USSR from the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the
Winter War, 1939,” Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2001): 433.
32 Kalervo Hovi, “Finland’s Rapprochement to National-Socialist Germany as Reaction Against Winter War,”
Romanian Journal for Baltic & Nordic Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2013): 58.
33 Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland,” 222.
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It is worth noting that some scholars assert that Russia, given its relationship with
Germany, was not legitimately concerned about a German invasion.34 Instead, it was
primarily motivated by a desire to restore the bounds of the old empire through
subjugating weaker peoples, like the Finns.35 While it is clear that Russia was looking out
for its own imperial interests,36 which doubtlessly included expansion as its behavior after
the end of World War II amply demonstrates, it still had good reason to be concerned about
its defensive position given Germany’s recent actions. While not as significant as the
German invasion of Poland or its actions toward Austria or Czechoslovakia, one factor that
worried Russian leaders and threatened to compromise its defensive position was the
Anglo-German Naval Agreement.37 The agreement allowed Germany to radically increase
the size of its fleet, threatening Russian control of the Baltic Sea and its vital sea route to
the Atlantic. Germany’s decision to strengthen its surface fleet, as authorized by the AngloGerman Naval Agreement, likely played a significant role in Russia’s decision to include
access to a naval base in the Baltic Sea as one of its primary demands to Finland. Thus,
while Russia was undoubtedly seeking to increase its area of control, it had legitimate
causes of concern about German aggression through Finland or the Gulf of Finland and felt
the need to appear stronger and better defended by altering its borders with Finland.38
Regardless of Russia’s motives, size, and relative might, Finland was not interested in
conceding its territory to Russia or anyone else. The years since 1917 and the deepening
world crisis in 1939 had not led Finland to forget its long history under Russian
domination. Its experiences, including Russian interference in Finnish politics in the
interwar period, contributed to a “legacy of suspicion” toward Russian diplomatic offers,
especially those in which Russia would gain control of historically Finnish territory.39 As
Russian domination of Estonia following its mutual assistance pact had proved, 40
surrendering Finnish territory or military freedom of action to their “former imperial
masters” would severely threaten Finland’s sovereignty and independence.41
Not only was Finland suspicious of Russia’s motives, it was also hesitant to enter into
binding relations with any major-power bloc during this period of its history.42 Its
hesitancy was only increased by the Russians’ suggestion that Finland ought to ally itself
militarily with Russia against the prospect of German aggression. Just as Finland saw
Communist Russia in terms of the Tsars’ suppression of Finnish sovereignty, it still thought
of Germany as the supporter of its independence movement in 1917.43 Though NationalSocialist Germany was very different from the Kaiser’s Germany, Finland still had
significant economic, scholastic, cultural, and ecclesiastical ties with Germany and the
Varrak, “The Secret Dossier of Finnish Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim,” 84.
Ibid, 85.
36 Roger Reese, “Lessons of the Winter War: A Study in the Military Effectiveness of the Red Army, 19391940,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 72, No. 3 (2008): 827.
37 Ibid, 86.
38 Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland,” 222.
39 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 169.
40 Evald Laasi, “Finland’s Winter War and Estonian Neutrality,” Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 24, No. 3 (1993):
269-270.
41 Citino, “White Death,” 45.
42 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 170.
43 Hovi, “Finland’s Rapprochement to National-Socialist Germany,” 58.
34
35
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German-speaking peoples.44 Thus, despite its growing disillusionment with Nazi Germany’s
expansionistic behavior, Finland was inclined to see Germany as its defender against
Russia rather than the other way around.45
Although Finland received no substantive promises of support from any of its neighbors or
the western powers, it refused Russian demands time and time again throughout the offand-on negotiations of 1939. Though the Finns ordered a partial military mobilization in
response to Russian activity in Latvia and Estonia during October, it was optimistic that
German interest in Finland would deter Russia from advancing its demands through
force.46 This confidence in German support prompted Finland to assert a stronger
negotiating stance with Russia than its military position—or the secret details of the NaziSoviet Pact—would suggest was prudent.
After months of unproductive diplomatic activity, Russian patience expired on November
9th, as the negotiations ground to a halt.47 Though Russia could have simply reinitiated
negotiations at another time, failing to gain even modest concessions from its small
neighbor made Russia appear weak on the world stage and lent credibility to reports of its
military inability.48 Unwilling to wait or suffer the uncertainty of the status quo, Russian
forces staged a military incident on November 26th near the Finnish border and quickly
demanded that the Finns remove their troops from the region.49 Finland again failed to
comply with its demands and Russia invaded on November 30th, 1939.50
The Russian battle plan required the roughly twenty divisions contained in the Leningrad
Military District—composed mainly of reservists—to overwhelm and destroy the Finnish
defenses in only twelve days.51 Given its timetable, the Soviets were clearly expecting their
invasion of Finland to mirror Germany’s quick invasion and subjugation of Poland.52
However, almost nothing would go according to plan for the Russian military in 1939.
Russian leaders, guilty of consistently underestimating the strength of Finnish troops and
defenses,53 divided their forces into two groups. The first army group attacked straight up
the Karelian Isthmus from Leningrad, while the second army group entered Finland
through its long eastern flank.54 Russian forces, though significantly superior in strength
and material, were steadily defeated by the hardy Finnish resistance.55 Russia’s divided
forces were not strong enough to break through the Mannerheim Line along the Karelian
Ibid, 58.
Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 171.
46 Doerr, “Frigid but Unprovocative,” 431.
47 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 184.
48 Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland,” 217.
49 Anderson, “Origins of the Winter War,” 186.
50 Keegan, The Second World War, 47.
51 Reese, “Lessons of the Winter War,” 827.
52 Citino, “White Death,” 45.
53 Roger Reese, “Surrender and Capture in the Winter War and Great Patriotic War: Which was the Anomaly?”
Global War Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2011): 91.
54 Keegan, The Second World War, 47.
55 Reese, “Lessons of the Winter War,” 828.
44
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Isthmus nor mobile enough to compete with the agile ski troops on Finland’s eastern
border. Consequently, Russian troops—after a quick initial advance—began suffering
heavy losses and either ground to a halt against the camouflaged bunkers and anti-tank
defenses of the Mannerheim Line, or were surrounded and ambushed by invisible foes in
the snowbound forests.56 The Russian military, however, was able to learn from its
mistakes in 1939 and, by the spring of 1940, launched a new offensive that took advantage
of its numerical strength, uniting its forces and compelling Finland to fight a war of attrition
that its small population could not withstand.57 105 days after the war began—on March
13—Finland’s high casualties forced it to sign a peace treaty giving in to Russian
demands.58
Though in theory the war ended in a Russian victory, it is arguable that the costs of war had
hollowed the spoils of success. In this vein, Nikita Khrushchev would later say that “all of us
sensed in our victory a defeat by the Finns.”59 On the positive side, Russia had acquired
more territory than it had originally sought in negotiations, including the naval bases in the
Gulf of Finland and the land on the Karelian Isthmus, which it considered so important to
Russian national defense.60 However, it had come at a terrible cost in life. All told, the
Russian military had over 500,000 men killed or injured in the conflict, while the Finnish
army lost only 60,000 men.61 In addition to its appalling loss of life, the Russian military
lost any prestige it had maintained through the interwar period.62 Hitler and his generals
looked at the Winter War and saw confirmation of their view that communism, whatever
its numerical advantage, had a “hollow center.”63 Less ideologically, they found evidence
that Stalin’s massacre of Russian military commanders in 1937 and 1938 had produced an
incompetent, poorly-led army that would be quickly defeated by the well-trained and ablycommanded German armies.64 By acquiring territory crucial to Russia's defense should
Germany invade, Russia achieved its tactical objectives. However, this supposed
accomplishment actually weakened its defense and increased its risk of a German invasion.
Before the German Invasion of Russia in 1941, Adolf Hitler told his generals that they had
only “to kick in the door and the whole rotten structure [would] come crashing down."65
Implicit in this phrase is Hitler’s analysis of Russia’s military strength as demonstrated by
the Winter War. Though he clearly learned from Russia’s poor showing in the first half of
the Winter War, it seems he took no lessons from the second half. Arguably, if Hitler had
viewed the Winter War as an integrated whole, he would have reached a radically different
conclusion about Russian military effectiveness and resilience. The Winter War certainly
Ibid, 828.
Ibid, 830.
58 Timo Toivonen, “War and Equality: The Social Background of the Victims of the Finnish Winter War,”
Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 4 (1998): 473.
59 Citino, “White Death,” 50.
60 Spring, “The Soviet Decision for War against Finland,” 208.
61 Reese, “Lessons of the Winter War,” 830.
62 Martin Kahn, “‘Russia Will Assuredly Be Defeated’: Anglo-American Government Assessments of Soviet War
Potential before Operation Barbarossa,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2012), 227.
63 Keegan, The Second World War, 174.
64 Citino, “White Death,” 50.
65 Reese, “Lessons of the Winter War,” 852.
56
57
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displayed many significant weaknesses in the Russian Army. Most notable of which were
its shortage of experienced commanders, its poorly-trained troops,66 and the inefficient
organization of the Commissar system.67 However, the War also showed Russia’s military
strength, albeit in an unconventional fashion. Though the Russian attack began
disastrously, the army was able to regroup, overcome poor leadership, suffer enormous
losses, and achieve victory over a superior foe by relentless attacks and weight of
numbers.68 In spite of all its failures, the Russian army overcame the enemy. The Germans,
then, should have realized that the Russian army would not be broken by a quick campaign
during the summer of 1941. Russian commanders would come and go, but, with its nearly
limitless reserves, the Russian army would continue to fight until it eventually wore down
its opponent. Viewed in this light, the Winter War boded ill for Hitler’s decision to kick in
the Russian door with Operation Barbarossa.
Russia’s decision to invade Finland in 1939 was motived by a desire to project strength and
secure its border from invasion through Finland. It could be argued that it failed in both of
these respects. First, in its efforts to secure its border against an invasion from Finland, it
secured the animus of the Finnish people, guaranteeing that when a German invasion came,
it would be accompanied by the aggrieved armies of Finland fighting to regain their
territory.69 Second, though it eventually made Finland acquiesce to its demands, Russia was
not able to project strength in doing so. In fact, contrary to its intention, the Winter War
convinced the world that Russia would fall easily to a first-rate army.70 Thus, the War
projected not Russian strength, but its weakness. However, its apparent weakness was
what fooled Hitler into gambling his armies in a lightning attack on Moscow. Among
Russia’s gains in the Winter War was the contempt of German military leadership—
allowing Russia to establish an empire far beyond that of the Tsars in Eastern Europe—as
it rolled back German advances along the path to Berlin in 1944.

Conclusion
Viewed in this light, it is clear that the Winter War—though it occurred during the
curiously quiet period between Hitler’s invasion of Poland and the true beginnings of
hostilities with the invasion of France—lays crucial groundwork for understanding the
larger conflict and the ultimate course of World War II. Without consideration of the
Winter War and its impact on Hitler’s perception of Russia’s military strength, it is difficult
to understand Hitler’s decision to provoke and attack the largest military in the world.
Without understanding why Stalin invaded Finland out of an intense fear of a German
invasion, Stalin’s later appeasement policy toward a Germany clearly arming to invade
makes little sense.71 In addition, the Winter War explains and provides a prototype of how
the Russian military could suffer such massive defeats in the summer of 1941, rearm and
Reese, “Surrender and Capture in the Winter War,” 98.
Kahn, “‘Russia Will Assuredly Be Defeated,’” 227.
68 Ibid, 852.
69 Toivonen, “War and Equality,” 473-474.
70 Kahn, “‘Russia Will Assuredly Be Defeated,’” 227.
71 Keegan, The Second World War, 180-181.
66
67
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regroup, and counterattack, turning the tide against superior German forces. Though it
lasted only 105 days, engaged only one major world power, and could be considered a
military fiasco, the Winter War played a crucial role in the development of World War II,
especially in the ways in which it impacted the decisions of Germany and Russia in 1940
and 1941 and foreshadowed the eventual outcome of a German invasion.
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